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a b s t r a c t
In many decisions we cannot consult explicit statistics telling us about the risks involved in
our actions. In lieu of such data, we can arrive at an understanding of our dicey options by
sampling from them. The size of the samples that we take determines, ceteris paribus, how
good our choices will be. Studies of decisions from experience have observed that people
tend to rely on relatively small samples from payoff distributions, and small samples are
at times rendered even smaller because of recency. We suggest one contributing and pre-
viously unnoticed reason for reliance on frugal search: Small samples amplify the differ-
ence between the expected earnings associated with the payoff distributions, thus
making the options more distinct and choice easier. We describe the magnitude of this
amplification effect, and the potential costs that it exacts, and we empirically test four of
its implications.
 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Being freed of tasks such as mating and territorial de-
fense, worker bees are particularly well suited for evolu-
tionary studies of choice (Real, 1992). Time and again,
they need to decide which area of potential food re-
sources to exploit—a choice rendered thorny due to
changing ecological conditions. Using an artificial patch
of flowers with varying colors signaling different amounts
and probabilities of nectar rewards, Real (1991, 1992)
investigated how a bee made choices in its uncertain hab-
itat. He found that if a bee were maximizing expected
utility, it chose as if it ‘‘misjudges the objective probabil-
ities and underestimates the rare event”—a finding that is
in ‘‘contrast with the conclusions of Kahneman and Tver-
sky” (Real, 1992 p. S132). Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
asserted that rare events—at least for humans—have more
impact than they deserve according to their objective
probabilities.
Investigations giving rise to the conclusion of opposite
perceptions of rarity, however, have dealt their agents—
bees versus humans—very different cards. In Real’s studies
(1991) bees were initially ignorant of the habitat’s distri-
bution of nectar and learned about their environment
while foraging. What Real described as bees’ misjudgments
of rare events relates to the discrepancy between bees’ im-
plicit estimates of the likelihood of the rewards, inferred
from their behavior, and actual probabilities. In contrast,
during studies on how humans make decisions under risk,
people receive perfect information about the payoff associ-
ated with each option and the probability of those payoffs
(e.g., 3 with certainty versus 32 with probability of .1, 0
otherwise). They thus make what Hertwig, Barron, Weber,
and Erev (2004) referred to as decisions from descriptions,
rendering foraging for information and estimating proba-
bilities superfluous.
2. Perception of rarity and small samples
What happens when people, like bees, sample informa-
tion from uncertain environments, thus making decisions
from experience (Hertwig et al., 2004)? Such decisions rep-
resent situations in which, being ignorant of the payoffs,
agents may resort to experience: experience garnered
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through sampling from the payoff distributions and
eventually arriving at what Knight (1921) called ‘‘statisti-
cal probabilities” based on the empirical classification of
instances (see Hau, Pleskac, & Hertwig, 2010). Such sam-
pling can occur in two fundamentally different ecologies,
one with an inherent trade-off between exploiting and
exploring options (see Barron & Erev, 2003; Berry & Frist-
edt, 1985; Erev & Barron, 2005), and one in which the
agent’s only objective, at least initially, is exploration for
information (Hertwig et al., 2004; Weber, Shafir, & Blais,
2004). In the former ecology, the sampled outcomes simul-
taneously provide information and payoffs to the agent. In
contrast, the sampled outcomes in the latter exploration-
only environment merely provide information, much like
attending a free wine-tasting fair, perusing the Gault-Mil-
lau or the Michelin Guide to select a restaurant, or taking
a quick look at the online traffic cams. Exploitation of the
options for payoffs—for example, dining at one of the ac-
claimed gastronomic temples—only comes after search
for information was terminated.
We focus on this second ecology. Hertwig et al.’s (2004)
study illustrates how it can be investigated. Participants
were asked to choose between two gambles (payoff distri-
butions). Lacking knowledge about them, they could ex-
plore each distribution by sampling from them.
Specifically, people saw two boxes on a computer screen
representing two possible gambles or outcome distribu-
tions. Clicking on a box triggered a random draw of an out-
come from the associated distribution. They were
encouraged to sample until they felt confident enough to
decide which box was ‘‘better”, in the sense that they
would prefer to draw from it during a final trial involving
real monetary payoffs. Hertwig et al. compared respon-
dents’ choices in this final trial with those of a group
who made decisions from description from the same prob-
lems. Choices differed drastically and systematically. In
description-based choices, rare outcomes were consistent
with prospect theory’s assumption of overweighting of
rare events (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In experience-
based choices, however, people behaved as if rare out-
comes had less impact than they deserved according to
their objective probabilities.1 This description–experience
gap has been replicated across a wide range of studies
(e.g., Erev, Glozman, & Hertwig, 2008; Hau et al., 2010;
Hau, Pleskac, Kiefer, & Hertwig, 2008; Rakow, Demes, &
Newell, 2008; Ungemach, Chater, & Stewart, 2009; Weber
et al., 2004; for a review of experience-based decision mak-
ing see Hertwig & Erev, 2009, and for a special issue on expe-
rience-based decision making see Rakow & Newell, 2010).
For bees and humans, the source of the relative lack of
appreciation of rare events appears to be the same: the
small samples on which they base their choice. Based on
investigations across different floral reward distributions,
Real (1992) concluded that ‘‘bees frame their decisions
on the basis of only a few visits” (p. S133). Focusing on hu-
mans, Hertwig et al. (2004) found that the typical number
of draws that respondents made was approximately seven
from each deck (and a median of 15 across both decks).
Hau et al. (2010) reviewed the sample sizes in five subse-
quent decisions from experience studies in which people
were instructed to sample until they felt confident enough
to decide between the two payoff distributions, and in
which monetarily only their final choice mattered (unlike
in Barron & Erev, 2003). Consistent with Hertwig et al.’s
original observation, sample sizes fell in a surprisingly
small range from 9 to 19 draws, amounting to nearly
7 ± 2 draws from each deck. The only outlier was Hau
et al.’s (2008) observation of 33 draws (Study 2) in a con-
dition involving an order of magnitude larger payoff than
in other studies.
Based on these observations, it seems fair to say that so
far, ceteris paribus, the finding of relatively small sample
sizes in decisions from experience studies is robust. Admit-
tedly, referring to these sample sizes as ‘‘small” is some-
what arbitrary, as, of course, samples could have been
even smaller. Yet, if one keeps in mind that each draw re-
quires an investment of merely a few seconds and that
people’s small samples systematically and noticeably mis-
represented the probabilities of rare events, the conclusion
that people in these studies framed their decisions on rel-
atively ‘‘small” samples appears justified. For example, in
Hau et al.’s (2008) Study 1, respondents who sampled a
median of 11 draws across both distributions did not even
encounter the rare event in 50.3% of all trials, and the med-
ian difference between the experienced relative frequency
and the objective probability of the nonzero outcomes was
10.9 percentage points.
Small samples interact with the statistical structure of
the environment in systematic ways. To see this, consider
a gambling environment with binomially distributed out-
comes, and where n is the number of draws from a partic-
ular gamble or deck, and p is the probability of the
maximum outcome in the gamble. When n is small (i.e.,
few draws) and/or p is small (i.e. the event is rare) the
binomial distribution is skewed for the number of times
this rare outcome will be observed in n independent tri-
als. For such distributions, one is more likely to encounter
the rare event less frequently than expected (np) than
more frequently than expected. For illustration, let us as-
sume that a person samples 10 times from a distribution
in which the critical event has a probability of .1 and esti-
mates the event’s probability to be the proportion in the
sample that she observes. The probabilities that she will
observe the critical event more than once, less than once,
or exactly once are .26, .35, and .39, respectively. That is,
the person is more likely to underestimate than to overes-
timate the frequency of the rare event (.35 versus .26).
This asymmetry decreases the larger n becomes, for
example, from 9 percentage points to 7, 6, and 5 percent-
age points for sample sizes of 10, 20, 30, and 40,
respectively.
Next, we consider possible reasons why people appear
content with small samples, and how the fact that the rare
event is more likely to be under- than overrepresented in
small samples changes the options that people actually
experience.
1 Fox and Hadar (2006) correctly pointed out that this weighting pattern
in experience-based choice need not be in conflict with prospect theory,
and that prospect theory can account for decisions from experience if its
input is the sampled rather than the experienced probabilities (see also
Hau, Pleskac, Kiefer, & Hertwig, 2008).
226 R. Hertwig, T.J. Pleskac / Cognition 115 (2010) 225–237
Author's personal copy
3. Why do people rely on small samples?
There are a number of possible and not exclusive factors
that may contribute jointly to people’s reliance on small
samples. One could be opportunity costs. Searching for
information takes time—time during which people cannot
pursue other activities. In other words, in a context in
which exploration and exploitation do not coincide, sam-
pling is costly in terms of the things that one has to forgo.
This fact matters even more if the payoffs are such that not
making optimal choices (say in terms of expected value or
utility maximization) does not exact a substantial cost (see
Harrison, 1992; Smith, 1982, on the precept of payoff dom-
inance; and von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986, for a discus-
sion of flat maxima). Indeed, Hau et al.’s (2008) finding that
increasing payoffs by an order of magnitude can triple
sample size indicates that opportunity costs and payoff
magnitude shape people’s search efforts.
Another possible contributory factor to the termination
of search is limited short-termmemory. Specifically, such a
limit could provide a natural stopping rule for information
acquisition (Kareev, 2000). In support of this prediction,
Rakow et al. (2008) found that people’s working memory
capacities were related to the sample sizes that they used
to make decisions from experience (Rakow et al., 2008).2
Not ruling out these and other possible factors, we sug-
gest that another reason why respondents’ sampling is
economical may be because small samples make it easier
to choose between the options. For illustration, consider
a person who draws seven observations from deck A that
(in the long run) offers $32 with probability .1, $0 other-
wise, and seven from deck B that offers $3 for sure (a deci-
sion problem studied by Hertwig et al., 2004). She may
encounter a ‘‘0” seven times from deck A, and a ‘‘3” each
time from deck B, amounting to a sample mean of 0 and
3, respectively. Let us also assume that the person deter-
mines her choice on the basis of the absolute difference be-
tween the sample means, an assumption to which we
return later. In our example, the absolute difference be-
tween the sample means, the experienced difference, is thus
15 times as large as the description difference (i.e., the
objective difference between the gambles’ expected val-
ues), 3 versus 0.2. That is, the experienced difference is
amplified, relative to the description difference. This ampli-
fication was the rule rather than the exception in Hertwig
et al. In 81% of choices, experienced differences were
amplified—on average, by a factor of 10.8—relative to
description differences. Similarly, in Rakow et al.’s (2008)
study, the median absolute difference between the sample
means was 2, relative to the median difference between
the expected values of 0.125 based on the objective prob-
abilities—an amplification by a factor of 16 (see Hau
et al., 2010). As a consequence of small samples, options
appeared more dissimilar and therefore, ceteris paribus,
more easily discernable than they would be on the basis
of their objective properties, and (some) people may make
decisions sooner than they would do otherwise.
To avoid misunderstandings, we do not argue that
amplified differences make it easier to detect which gam-
ble has the objective highest payoff. Instead, we assert
that—much like Griffin and Tversky (1992) proposed with
confidence judgments—decision makers focus, but not
exclusively, on the strength of evidence as opposed to the
weight of evidence in decisions from experience and conse-
quently terminate search early. Griffin and Tversky illus-
trated the distinction between the strength and weight
using another sequential process, repeated coin flipping:
[S]uppose we wish to evaluate the evidence for the
hypothesis that a coin is biased in favor of heads rather
than in favor of tails. In this case, the proportion of
heads in a sample reflects the strength of evidence for
the hypothesis in question, and the size of the sample
reflects the credence of these data. The distinction
between the strength of evidence and its weight is clo-
sely related to the distinction between the size of an
effect (e.g., a difference between two means) and its
reliability (e.g., the standard error of the difference).
Although it is not always possible to decompose the
impact of evidence into the separate contributions of
strength and weight, there are many contexts in which
they can be varied independently. . . . the same propor-
tion of heads can be observed in a small or large sample
(p. 412).
Analogously, in choosing between gambles during deci-
sions from experience, the strength would be the differ-
ence between sample means and the weight would be
the standard error of the difference. If people encounter a
large difference in a relatively small sample, and if they va-
lue strength of evidence more than weight of evidence, this
difference may be ‘‘good enough” for them to stop search.
Just as in Simon’s (1983) theory of search, if the difference
between sample means surpasses an aspiration level (i.e., is
good enough) no further information will be required and a
choice is rendered.
In fact, assuming the same decision problem, the ex-
pected strength of evidence will always be as large or lar-
ger in experienced-based than in description-based choice.
Specifically, the absolute expected difference between the
sample means, SMA and SMB, will always be as large or lar-
ger than the expected or description difference, EVA  EVB.
Hertwig and Pleskac (2008, pp. 216–217) provided a sim-
ple proof for this fact (see Appendix A). The intuition be-
hind this proof is that the distribution of absolute
experienced differences is asymmetrical and small samples
tend to increase this asymmetry by increasing the propor-
tion of large experienced differences that point to either
gamble. As a result, the expected absolute difference is
pulled away from the long run expected difference,
EVA  EVB, or the description difference based on the gam-
ble’s expected values. The proof, however, leaves several
questions unanswered, including: What is the magnitude
of the amplification effect in a given uncertain environ-
2 The effect of a limited short-term memory on people’s final choice has
been less consistent. Hertwig et al. (2004) reported evidence for a recency
effect, whereas Rakow et al. (2008) found mixed evidence and Hau et al.
(2008) could not replicate it. Hau et al. (2010) also found no difference in
choice during experience-based decision making whether participants
were provided with a running record of their past sampled observations, or
not. The former condition should eliminate the need to maintain items in
memory when making a choice.
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ment? And how often does the absolute sampling differ-
ence point the decision maker to the inferior gamble?
4. The amplification effect: how substantial and how
costly is it?
In order to answer these questions, Hertwig and Pleskac
(2008) developed an analytical framework that enables
one to determine both the magnitude and the costs of
the amplification effect in any given gambling environ-
ment. The details of this framework are described in Her-
twig and Pleskac; here we review the main findings. The
analysis assumes that a person samples from two payoff
distributions (decks), each one consisting of two outcomes
of the type ‘‘a probability p to win amount x; otherwise win
amount y” (x, p, y). The size of the sample that the person
draws ranges from 1, 2, . . . , to 50, from either deck. The
gambling environment consists of 1000 pairs of randomly
generated gambles. For each gamble, the probability values
were randomly sampled from a uniform distribution be-
tween 0 and 1. One payoff value was set to 0 whereas
the other payoff value was drawn from a uniform distribu-
tion between 0 and 100. None of the gamble pairs were al-
lowed to have stochastically dominating options.
As a function of sample sizes, Fig. 1 plots the expected
(and the median) absolute values of the experienced differ-
ences, across all gambles. The straight line represents the
average description difference. Small samples substantially
amplify the difference between gambles. For example, with
two draws from each deck, the average expected experi-
enced difference is 23.1, 1.5 times larger than the descrip-
tion difference of 15.2. Because of the law of large
numbers, as sample sizes increase the expected experi-
enced differences converge to the description difference.
With 10 draws per deck, the expected experienced differ-
ence (17.2) is merely 1.1 times larger than the description
difference, and with 25 draws, the differences are nearly
the same. The same regularity emerges for the median
experienced difference, except that the amplification effect
is smaller relative to the expected absolute values.
Fig. 1 also clarifies another important point. People gen-
erally do not terminate sampling when the absolute differ-
ence is largest, that is, after two draws per deck. Rather,
they appear to stop after 7 ± 2 draws per deck. This is con-
sistent with the notion that the decision of whether to ter-
minate search is by no means only determined by the
strength of evidence (the difference between the sample
means) but to some extent also by its reliability (the stan-
Fig. 1. Experienced differences across 1000 pairs of gambles as a function of sample size (per deck). The curves represent (a) the mean of the expected
absolute difference, (b) the median of the experienced absolute difference and (c) the first and third quartiles of the experienced absolute difference. The
straight horizontal line represents the average description difference based on expected value (15.2).
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dard error of the difference, or a simple proxy of it, the
sample size). That people have some notion of the reliabil-
ity of parameter estimates is both consistent with the
assertion by Jacob Bernoulli, who formulated the first ver-
sion of the law of large numbers, that ‘‘even the stupidest
man knows by some instinct of nature per se and by no pre-
vious instruction” that the greater the number of confirm-
ing observations, the surer the conjecture (cited in Daston,
1988; Gigerenzer et al., 1989, p. 29), and with the available
evidence regarding people’s intuition about sample size
(see Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer’s, 1997, review and distinc-
tion between frequency and sampling distributions).
The old adage of economists goes, ‘‘There’s no such
thing as a free lunch”. Indeed, searchers do not get to enjoy
for free the simultaneous advantages of small search costs,
small opportunity costs, and amplified differences. The
price comes in terms of a somewhat inaccurate representa-
tion of the gambles’ parameters, and as a possible conse-
quence, less than optimal choices. How big is this price?
To find out how costly relying on small samples is, Hertwig
and Pleskac (2008) calculated how often a respondent who
invariably selected the option with larger sample mean
would succeed in choosing the objectively better gamble
(accuracy) as a function of sample size (effort). Fig. 2 sum-
marizes the results of this effort–accuracy analysis.
Although choices derived from small samples are not opti-
mal, they are surprisingly good. With a sample as tiny as
one draw the chance to select the better gamble is approx-
imately 60%. Drawing as few as seven times from each
deck offers an 81% chance of selecting the better gamble.3
Moreover, accuracy continues to increase at a diminishing
rate. A person can, for example, increase the likelihood of
selecting the higher expected value gamble from 60% to
78% by increasing sample size from 1 to 5. By doubling sam-
ple size from 10 to 20 draws, accuracy increases by merely 2
percentage points.
In sum, several studies that employed the sampling de-
sign as used by Hertwig et al. (2004) observed that people
relied on relatively small samples, amounting to about
7 ± 2 draws from each deck. Yet, the amplification effect
is only one key factor explaining why people tend to rely
on relatively small samples. Several factors are likely to
shape people’s search, including opportunity costs, magni-
Fig. 2. Choice proportions of the deck with the higher expected value (EV) as a function of sample size (per deck), averaged across 1000 pairs of gambles.
The assumption is that for each n the deck with the larger sample mean is selected.
3 Of course, how good or bad this level of accuracy is depends on several
factors including a person’s payoff function. However, compared to the
level of accuracy that people reach in various inferential domains—for
instance, inferring which of two risks claims more lives per year (e.g.,
Hertwig, Pachur, & Kurzenhäuser, 2005; Pachur & Hertwig, 2006)—this
level of accuracy is high.
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tude of payoffs, memory constraints, and possibly the op-
tions’ variance. Moreover, although a person’s ability to
choose the higher expected value gamble was diminished
with small samples, our analysis showed that small sam-
ples are not ruinous to choosing the higher expected value
gamble. Johnson, Budescu, and Wallsten (2001) reported
an analogous result when aggregating probability judg-
ments to form a new probability judgment: judges can
be quite accurate when averaging very few judgments. Be-
fore we describe testable implications of the amplification
effect, let us briefly turn to how the difference between op-
tions relates to difficulty of choice and to choice strategies.
5. Differences in sample means, choice difficulty, and
choice strategies
Several factors make the choice between gambles easy
or difficult, including the options’ outcome variance or
lack thereof (see Weber et al., 2004) and the extent to
which outcomes and their probabilities are negatively
correlated (thus causing the experience of conflicts and
difficult trade-offs, e.g., Shanteau & Thomas, 2000). In
light of these and other properties, how important a
determinant of choice difficulty is the difference between
the expected values of gambles (decisions from descrip-
tion) and the difference between samples’ means associ-
ated with gambles (decisions from experience),
respectively?
There are two converging answers to this question:
one stems from psychophysics, the other from early re-
search on risky choice. In psychophysics it is well estab-
lished that as the objective difference between two
stimuli (e.g., difference in line lengths or weights) grows
larger, a person’s judgments become more and more reli-
able, giving rise to the typical S-shaped psychometric
function. In other words, with larger differences in the
physical stimuli, it becomes easier to discriminate be-
tween them and the correct stimulus is identified more
often (Link, 1992; Urban, 1910). Second, Mosteller and
Nogee (1951; see also Edwards, 1955) established that
an analogical psychometric function exists for choices be-
tween gambles so that as the difference between the ex-
pected values of two options grew so did the probability
of choosing one of the options. When the options were of
essentially equal expected value the probability was close
to .5. In other words, the strength of preference grows as
a function of the difference in expected values of gambles
(Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993).
In experienced-based choice, the amplification effect is
likely to play a role because the difference between the
sample means is a cue relevant to several choice strategies
that people may exploit. One is the natural-mean heuristic
(Hertwig & Pleskac, 2008). It was originally proposed in
the context of n-armed bandit problems (Sutton & Barto,
1998) as a simple method for estimating the values of ac-
tions (e.g., the play of one of a slot machine’s levers), and
for using the estimates to make action selection decisions.
According to Sutton and Barto, ‘‘the true value of an action
is the mean reward received when that action is selected.
One natural way to estimate this is by averaging the re-
wards actually received when the action was selected”
(p. 27). Applied to decisions from experience, the natural-
mean heuristic consists of two steps:
Step 1. Calculate the natural mean of experienced obser-
vations in both decks by summing, separately for each
deck, all n experienced outcomes and then dividing by
n.
Step 2. Choose the deck with the larger natural mean
(i.e., the deck that had the best average outcome in
the sampling phase).
As Hau et al. (2008) pointed out, the natural-mean heu-
ristic has several interesting characteristics. For one, the
natural-mean heuristic makes the same outcome or choice
predictions as the expected value calculus applied to sam-
pled probabilities and outcomes. However, the heuristic
arrives at the choice through a shortcut. Rather than keep-
ing track of all outcomes and their respective probabilities,
multiplying each by the other and summing up, the heuris-
tic tots up all experienced rewards (or losses) per gamble
and then divides this sum by the sample size per deck to
yield the ‘‘natural mean.” In a model competition between
15 choice models, Hau et al. found that the natural-mean
heuristic was among a small set of models that performed
best in predicting people’s decisions from experience. Of
course, the natural-mean heuristic will always choose the
option with the favorable sample mean, regardless of
how large this advantage is. However, it appears plausible
to assume that a user of the natural-mean heuristic will
find the choice the easier, the larger the difference in sam-
ple means.
The natural-mean heuristic, however, is not the only
choice model subject to the amplification effect. Hertwig
and Pleskac (2008) also showed that the amplification
occurs when the experienced outcomes and probabilities
per sample are entered into cumulative prospect theory’s
value and weighting function (see their Fig. 10.1). This is
not surprising because a sample’s natural mean is quan-
titatively (although not computationally) identical to the
sample’s expected value (assuming the experienced
probabilities and outcomes). More generally, any choice
theory that retains the Bernoullian framework scaffolding
(see Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2006)—namely,
the assumption that people behave as if they multiplied
some function of probability and value, and then maxi-
mized—will entail the amplification effect.
6. The amplification effect: an empirical test
Our thesis is that, relative to large samples, small sam-
ples amplify the difference between the expected earnings
associated with the payoff distributions, thus rendering the
options more distinct and choice easier, and that ease is
one of several factors that determine termination of search
in experienced-based choice. This thesis has several test-
able implications:
Prediction 1. Assuming identical problems, people who
make experienced-based choices and rely on small
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samples will perceive choice as easier than respondents
who make description-based choices.
This prediction assumes the difference between the
sample means to be one determinant of choice difficulty,
and builds on the fact that smaller samples will, ceteris
paribus, result in larger differences between the experi-
enced sample means (Fig. 1 and Appendix A), thereby mak-
ing the options more distinct.
Prediction 2. If experienced-based choices are based on
small samples and this sample information is being
described to yoked partners, then they will perceive
the resulting decisions from description as easier than
respondents who make decisions from descriptions
involving the objective probabilities.
This prediction is derived as follows: One group’s sam-
pled experience can be summarized and described to an-
other group. Thereby, this yoked-description group
responds to the same probabilities and outcomes that the
experience group saw (see Hau et al., 2010; Rakow et al.,
2008). Moreover, the yoked-description group responds
to gambles in which the differences between the expected
values are, on average, larger (because of reliance on small
samples) than in the description group involving the objec-
tive probabilities.
Prediction 3. Frugal searchers, that is, respondents who
rely on small samples, will find choice easier than avid
searchers.
This prediction is derived as follows: Several factors
have an effect on the decision to terminate search; ease
of choice is only one among them. Therefore, there will
be people that sample avidly in decisions from experience.
They, in turn, will not benefit from the amplification effect
and consequently, so we predict, perceive choice as more
difficult than the frugal searchers.
Prediction 4. Frugal searchers, that is, respondents who
rely on small samples, will arrive at greater preference
strength than avid searchers.
One measure of strength of preference is in terms of the
absolute difference of the choice proportions from the
indifference point (i.e., 50%). If frugal searchers find choices
easier than avid searchers, then—ceteris paribus—their
preference may be stronger. Clearly, many factors can af-
fect preference strength; ease of choice is only one among
them. One can find support for Prediction 4 in comparisons
across studies. In Hau et al.’s (2008) Studies 1 and 2, the
median sample size was 11 and 33 draws (caused by the
order of magnitude higher payoffs). Consistent with Pre-
diction 4, the average absolute difference of the choice pro-
portions from 50% was 18 and 8.8 percentage points,
respectively. That is, with larger samples, respondents be-
came more indifferent between the options. In what fol-
lows, we test whether this difference can be replicated
within the same study.
These four predictions were tested in the following
experiment.
6.1. Methods
A total of 265 students at Michigan State University par-
ticipated in the study for class credit in addition to a mon-
etary reward based on their choices. Eighty-nine
participants in the description group saw twelve problems
(Table 1) described on a computer screen. Eighty-eight par-
ticipants in the experience group saw two buttons on a
computer screen and were told that each button was asso-
Table 1
Summary of the decisions problems and results.
Decision problem Option Percentage choosing H
H L Description group Experience group Yoked-description group
1 4, .8 3, 1
F 26 60* 50*
2 3, 1.0 4, .8F 46 62* 60
3 4, .2F 3, .25 74 47
* 46*
4 3, .25 F 4, .2 64 65 60
5 32, .10F 3, 1 44 18
* 33
6 16, .2F 3, 1 36 24 38
7 3, 1.0F 32, .1 64 24* 47*
8 32, .025F 3, 1.0 33 21
* 28
9 10, .1F 1, 1.0 39 22
* 36
10 10, .9 9, 1.0F 18 78* 63*
11 10, .9F 9, 1.0 47 72 70
12 10, .05F 1, .5 34 35 28
Mean experience–description gapa 18 11
Note: Underlining indicates the options including rare events. H = option with the higher expected value (as calculated by probability times monetary
value); L = option with the lower expected value. For each option only one outcome is given, followed by its probability; the second outcome, which is not
stated, was 0 and occurred with a probability complementary to the stated one. F = option favored by the rare event.
* p < .05.
a The mean experience–description gap was calculated as the difference in the predicted direction between proportions of participants choosing H in the
experience group versus the description and yoked-description groups.
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ciated with a different payoff distribution (money ma-
chine). They could explore the distributions by pressing
one of two color-coded buttons on a keyboard, thus elicit-
ing the sampling of one outcome (with replacement) at a
time. The outcome appeared for one second. Respondents
were instructed to sample until they felt confident enough
to decide from which single distribution to draw for a real
payoff. At that point, they indicated with a button press
their preferred money machine and proceeded to the next
problem. Eighty-eight participants in the yoked-description
group saw described gambles on the computer screen,
with the objective probabilities replaced with the observed
relative frequency of the outcomes from a corresponding
yoked partner in the experience group.
Respondents in the two description groups were asked,
after each choice: ‘‘How difficult was it for you to make
your final choice between the two money machines?”. In
order to focus participants in the experience group on their
choice rather than on the process of search, respondents in
the experience group were asked: ‘‘Once you obtained en-
ough information to make a decision, how difficult was it
for you to make your final choice between the two money
machines?”. All respondents rated choice difficulty on a
scale from 1 (‘‘extremely easy”) to 6 (‘‘extremely difficult”).
After a person had completed all twelve choices and ease
ratings, the computer played out the chosen gambles and
the participant was paid accordingly. Each point was worth
$0.01 (thus replicating the incentive structure in Hertwig
et al., 2004). To make sure that nobody would lose money,
all participants were given $1.00 at the beginning of the
study.
Respondents in all three groups saw 12 decision prob-
lems (see Table 1). Half of the problems were identical to
the problems investigated by Hertwig et al. (2004); the
other half were studied by Rakow et al. (2008); see also
Weber et al., 2004. Eight problems present options with
small difference between their expected value (as calcu-
lated by probability times monetary value), and four prob-
lems offer options with identical expected values
(problems 9–12). Moreover, eight problems offer positive
and four offer negative prospects.
7. Results
Before turning to the predictions, we report to what ex-
tent previous results were replicated. Across all 12 prob-
lems, 14 participants in the experience group made only
one draw from each payoff distribution before proceeding
with their choice. Because our set-up required everybody
to make at least one draw from each option, they either
misunderstood the instruction or were unwilling to invest
any effort. We removed these participants and their corre-
sponding ‘‘partners” in the yoked-description group. Their
removal, however, did not alter the qualitative patterns of
the results.
As in previous studies, decisions from experience dif-
fered from decisions from descriptions. As shown in Ta-
ble 1, the percentage of respondents who chose option H
(i.e., the option with the higher expected value, as calcu-
lated by probability times monetary value) differed mark-
edly between the groups. In 11 of the 12 problems, the
ordinal difference was consistent with Hertwig et al.’s
(2004) hypothesis that in decisions from experience, rare
events carry less impact than they deserve according to
their objective probability than in decisions from descrip-
tion (the only exception was problem 11). In three out of
11 problems, the description–experience gap was small
(problems 4, 6, and 12), and in eight problems the differ-
ences were significantly different according to a t-test of
proportions. Across all problems, the average (absolute)
description–experience gap amounted to 18 percentage
points (correcting for the hypothesis-inconsistent differ-
ence in problem 11).
Also replicating previous results, some of the impact of
rare events in decisions from experience is attributable to
the small samples that participants drew and the ensuing
sampling error that they experienced. The median total
sample from both decks was 12 (Inter-Quartile Range
(IQR) = 18; M = 18; std = 17). Sampling was equally dis-
persed between the H and L (lower expected value) options
with a median of 6 and 6 observations, respectively. Com-
paring choices in the experience and the yoked-description
group reveals the effect of sampling error on choice. Here,
the mean description–experience gap was 11 percentage
points, and in only four problems was the difference signif-
icantly different. This suggests that sampling error is one
source behind the description–experience gap but others
are contributing as well (see Hertwig and Erev, 2009, for
a review of the possible factors). Let us now turn to Predic-
tions 1–4.
7.1. Were choices based on small samples perceived easier?
According to Prediction 1, people who rely on small
samples in experienced-based decisions will find choices
easier than respondents who face structurally identical
problems and receive perfect information about outcomes
and their probabilities. Respondents in our experience
group relied on samples about as small as those observed
in Hertwig et al. (2004) and others studies. In line with Pre-
diction 1, they rated their choice easier than the descrip-
tion group. Across all decision problems and people, the
median ease ratings for decisions from description and
experience were 3 (IQR = 2) versus 2 (IQR = 3)—a signifi-
cant difference (Mann–Whitney test: z = 2.32, p = .021).
7.2. Were choices based on yoked descriptions perceived
easier?
According to Prediction 2, when people receive the
sampled information of the experience group, condensed
into descriptions of outcomes and probabilities (yoked
descriptions), they will find choice easier than people fac-
ing descriptions of the objective probabilities and out-
comes. In line with this prediction, the ease rating of the
description and yoked-description group differed strongly,
with median ease ratings of 3 (IQR = 2) and 1 (IQR = 1) in
the description and yoked-description group, respectively
(z = 14.8, p < .001). Note that the ease ratings in the
yoked-description group are also lower than those in the
experience group (z = 11.8, p < .001). One possible reason
232 R. Hertwig, T.J. Pleskac / Cognition 115 (2010) 225–237
Author's personal copy
is that despite our request to only focus on the final choice
when assessing ease, the effort people mustered for sam-
pling and updating information spilled over into their ease
judgments. In contrast, the yoked-description group bene-
fited from amplification without the additional effort of
sequential search. If indeed such spill-over occurred, the
observed difference in the ease ratings of the experience
and description groups would be even larger without it.
7.3. Did frugal searchers find choice easier?
Because the amplification effect becomes smaller the
more that people sample, those who explore (sample)
more, ceteris paribus, should find choice more difficult. In
order to test Prediction 3, we performed a median split
based on sample size (across both options) in the experi-
ence group. The frugal searchers (taking 12 or fewer
draws) had a median ease rating of 2 (IQR = 2), whereas
the avid searchers arrived at a rating 3 (IQR = 2; z = 2.9,
p < .01).4 This difference was also echoed in the yoked-
description group. Those who saw the experience of avid
searchers found choices more difficult than those who
looked at the option through the eyes of frugal searchers,
with ease ratings of 1 (IQR = 1) and 2 (IQR = 2), respectively
(z = 9.5, p < .0001). This suggests that the reason for why
avid searchers find choice more difficult than frugal search-
ers is not additional search per se but the change in the expe-
rienced difference in sample means.
The previous analysis classified respondents in the
experience group according to their sampling effort.
Regardless of sample size, however, one can classify them
also according to whether their experienced differences
exceeded the description differences. Consistent with the
impact of the amplification effect, respondents whose
experienced differences were larger than the respective
description differences found choice less difficult
(2, IQR = 3) than those who experienced equally large or
smaller differences (3, IQR = 2; z = 2.5, p = .01).5 Again, this
finding is also mirrored in the yoked-description group.
Those who saw the ‘‘larger” differences found choice easier,
relative to those who saw the ‘‘as large or smaller” differ-
ences, with median ease ratings of 1 (IQR = 1) versus 2
(IQR = 2), respectively (z = 3.8, p < .001).
7.4. Did frugal searchers arrive at stronger preferences?
To the extent that frugal searchers, relative to avid
searchers, find choice easier, they may also arrive at stron-
ger preferences. In order to test Prediction 4, we employed
the same median split as before, and used the absolute dif-
ference of the choice proportions from the indifference
point (i.e., 50%) as a measure of preference strength. In 9
of 12 decision problems, the frugal samplers had more ex-
treme choice proportions than the avid samplers (p = .07),
and, on average, their choice proportions were 6 percent-
age points further from 50% than those of the avid search-
ers. In the yoked-description group, in 9 out of 12 cases,
the yoked-frugal searchers displayed more extreme choice
proportions than yoked-avid samplers (p = .07), and their
choice proportions were, on average, 9 percentage points
further from 50% than those of the yoked-avid searchers.
Thus, there is evidence for a link between ease and prefer-
ence strength, albeit not quite as strong as in the afore-
mentioned reanalysis of Hau et al.’s (2008) studies. One
reason could be that the difference in people’s sample sizes
was larger between Hau et al.’s studies, relative to the
present difference between frugal and avid samplers.
In sum, we empirically tested four implications of the
amplification effect. Consistent with Prediction 1, we
found that the experience group (who sampled frugally)
found choice easier than the description group. In line with
Prediction 2, we found that the yoked-description group
perceived choice to be easier than the description group.
In support of Prediction 3, we found that, relative to frugal
searchers, avid searchers in the experience group found
choice more difficult, and people who made the same
choices based on the condensed experience of avid and fru-
gal searchers exhibited parallel differences in ease ratings.
Finally, we also found indications that those who sample
less and find choice easier arrive at stronger preferences.
8. General discussion
Recent research on decisions from experience using the
sampling paradigm observed that respondents consis-
tently rely on relatively small samples of information. Her-
twig and Pleskac (2008) proposed a first step toward an
explanation of this phenomenon. In this article, we tested
implications of their amplification account. Next, we out-
line a framework for the termination of search, discuss
how amplification may contribute to other judgments than
risky choices, and review the potential benefits of small
samples.
8.1. A framework for termination of search
We have focused on one possible factor, perceived ease
of choice, impacting on search and its termination. Yet, as
stressed before, several factors are likely to be at work in a
person’s decision to end exploration. Some of them foster
further search, whereas others weigh in to stop. One way
to conceptualize this trade-off is in terms of Coombs and
Avrunin’s (1977) framework of single-peaked functions.
They pointed out that various dependent variables such
as ‘‘preferences” or ‘‘exploratory behavior” are frequently
observed to be single-peaked functions of independent
variables. Recently, Reutskaja and Hogarth (2009) ex-
tended their framework to the number of alternatives
available when making a choice. Coombs and Avrunin’s
single-peaked framework explains these functions in
terms of a ‘‘compromise between good and bad attributes
of a single quantity” (p. 219), and the psychological
4 The Goodman–Kruskal rank order correlation (G) between ease rating
and sample size in the experience group was G = .09, p < .01. The rank order
correlation between the ease rating of the yoked-description participants
and the sample size of their partner in the experience group was G = .37,
p < .001.
5 The Goodman–Kruskal rank order correlation between ease rating and
the experienced difference was G = .12, p < .001. The corresponding
correlation for the yoked condition was G = .22, p < .0001.
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principle that ‘‘Good things satiate and bad things escalate”
(p. 224).
Let us assume sample size (n) to be the single dimen-
sion in the domain of exploratory behavior. The good attri-
butes that come with search are primarily accuracy (e.g., a
more veridical picture of the world and better odds to
identify the more attractive options). When such good
things satiate, the utility of the benefits follow a concave,
negatively accelerated function. Indeed, our accuracy anal-
ysis in Fig. 2 revealed such a concave function. Of course,
search also exacts costs, for example, in terms of time,
opportunity costs, and increasing memory load and retrie-
val efforts. When bad things escalate, such costs, minor at
first, grow more and more rapidly as a function of n, so that
the combined utility of such costs is also negatively accel-
erated. Following Coombs and Avrunin (1977), the sum of
the utility functions for costs and benefits of search will be
a single-peaked function over n. Thus, depending on a per-
son’s exact cost and benefit utility functions, there is an
optimum in that the total utility is maximum for that n.
Fig. 3 illustrates the utility curves for costs and benefits
of exploration, and their combination. The peak is reached
when the marginal costs per draw begin to exceed the
marginal benefits. Note that a single peak would still
emerge even if the costs did not escalate but increased at
a constant rate.
This framework classifies the factors that impact search
and termination of search, and can help explain differences
in exploration in terms of either (a) differences in cost and
benefit functions or (b) differences in the combination
schemes for both functions. Based on this framework,
experimenters could consider how various manipulations
strengthen or weaken the impact of costs and benefits of
exploration, respectively. For example, providing larger
payoffs and requiring confidence judgments (e.g., ‘‘how
certain are you that you selected the better gambles?”)
may slow down the negative acceleration of the utility
curve for benefits. In contrast, imposing additional cogni-
tive load or making time scarce may spur the negative
acceleration of the costs of exploration.
8.2. Amplification beyond gambles
The amplification effect can also shed new light on clas-
sical research regarding people’s proclivity to reason statis-
tically. Fong, Krantz, and Nisbett (1986) asked respondents
to consider everyday problems to which the law of large
numbers could be brought to bear. In one problem, people
were asked to decide which of two car manufacturers, Vol-
vo or Saab, was more likely to produce cars free of trouble-
some repairs. Respondents could resort to two pieces of
information, namely, (a) objective information in terms
of the consensus of Consumer Reports’ experts and readers,
and (b) personal experience of three friends who owned
one of the cars. Fong et al. found that most people did
not spontaneously reason statistically, thus being guided
more by the personal experience rather than the aggregate
consensus. The amplification effect offers one possible
explanation as to why. The large sample, represented by
the aggregate consensus in Consumer Reports, suggests that
‘‘both cars were very sound mechanically, although the
Volvo was felt to be slightly superior on some dimensions”
(p. 285, emphasis added). The small sample, represented
by the friends’ experience, in contrast, reports a huge dif-
ference between both cars: ‘‘Both Saab owners reported
having had a few mechanical problems but nothing major.
The Volvo owner exploded when asked how he liked his
car. ‘First that fancy fuel injection computer thing went
out: $250 bucks. [. . .]. I finally sold it after 3 years for
junk’.” (p. 285). One way to interpret the lure of personal
experience is that the small sample amplifies the differ-
ence between the two options, whereas the large sample
reports only a slight difference. The small sample thus ren-
Fig. 3. Good things satiate and bad things escalate: The single-peakedness in an exploration domain (n = sample size).
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ders the choice easier, albeit pointing to the option that
may be inferior.
8.3. Some potential benefits of small samples
Only recently have cognitive psychologists and cogni-
tive ecologists begun to explain frugal information search
in terms of potential benefits of small samples. Traditional
accounts of why people rely on small samples implicate
(cognitive and economic) costs such as those involved in
internal and external search, opportunity costs, lack of
appreciation for the empirical law of large numbers, or
they attribute frugal search to limits in our cognitive archi-
tecture. Our results suggest that small samples make
choice easier—although not more accurate (though con-
sider Vul, Goodman, Griffiths and Tenenbaum’s, 2009,
argument that locally suboptimal decisions based on few
samples are globally optimal)—and contribute to a growing
appreciation of the various benefits of small samples. Some
of the benefits, however, are less disputed than others. One
advantage is, for example, the enhanced ability to detect
environmental change. An organism remembering only a
small number of recent events—tantamount to drawing
small samples from memory rather than from the environ-
ment—is better equipped to detect a change in its environ-
ment than it would be if it remembered all of its history
(e.g., Heinrich, 1979; McNamara & Houston, 1985, 1987;
Shafir & Roughgarden, 1998). The optimal number of items
to be remembered depends on the rate of the changes in
the environment, but perfect memory appears to be a lia-
bility rather than an advantage in a world that continues
to change.
Investigating the foraging behavior of bees across dif-
ferent floral reward distributions, Real (1992) argued that
calculating reward probabilities based on small frame
lengths could prove advantageous under several scenarios,
one of which takes the structure of bees’ natural habitat
into account:
short-term optimization may be adaptive when there is
a high degree of spatial autocorrelation in the distribu-
tion of floral resources. In most field situations, there is
intense local competition among pollinators for floral
resources. When ‘‘hot” and ‘‘cold” spots in fields of flow-
ers are created through pollinator activity, then such
activity will generate a high degree of spatial autocorre-
lation in nectar rewards. If information about individual
flowers is pooled, then the spatial structure of reward
distributions will be lost, and foraging over the entire
field will be less efficient. In spatially autocorrelated
environments (‘‘rugged landscapes”), averaging
obscures the true nature of the environment (p. S135).
In cognitive psychology, Kareev (1995, 2000) advanced
the argument that the cognitive system—more precisely,
working memory—may have evolved so as to increase
the chance for early detection of covariation. In Kareev
(2000), he argued that the experienced sample size most
conducive to the detection of useful binary correlations
(i.e., valueP .5) is close to Miller’s (1956) estimate of the
limited capacity of working memory. The detailed argu-
ment runs as follows: To determine whether two variables
covary—for example, whether fleeing behavior triggers a
predator’s chase behavior—one typically relies on data
sampled from one’s environment (and, perhaps, prior
expectations). If the assessment of a covariation has to be
made ‘‘on the fly,” the limited capacity of working memory
imposes an upper bound on the size of the information
sample that can be considered at one time. Kareev (2000)
then showed that samples of size 7 ± 2 increase the likeli-
hood of encountering a sample that indicates a stronger
correlation than that of the population. Thus, the limited
working memory functions as an amplifier of correlations,
leading to biased estimates. According to Kareev (2000, p.
401):
a biased estimate may better serve the functioning of
the organism than an unbiased one. By providing such
a biased picture, capacity limitation, may have evolved
so as to protect organisms from missing strong correla-
tions and to help them handle the daunting tasks of
induction.
This conjecture of the evolutionary advantage of small
samples (or, more precisely, a limited working memory)
has fueled a controversial debate (Anderson, Doherty, Berg,
& Friedrich, 2005; Juslin, Fiedler, & Chater, 2006; Juslin &
Olsson, 2005; Kareev, 2005). Juslin and Olsson, for exam-
ple, stressed that small samples not only amplify existing
contingencies (i.e., hits) but also advocate nonexisting con-
tingencies (i.e., false alarms). Moreover, if one takes both
hits and false alarms into account, the posterior probability
(based on a Bayesian analysis) that reality proves consis-
tent with a sample contingency will always be higher for
large than for small samples. In response, Fiedler and Kar-
eev (2006) demonstrated that if the decision maker’s aim is
to select the better of two options rather than estimating
the precise size of a contingency in a sample, and if this
choice is only made when the evidence in the sample ex-
ceeds some decision threshold, then performance (defined
in terms of hits and false alarms) can indeed decrease with
increasing sample size.
9. Conclusions
People and bees both appear to rely on relatively small
samples in their experience-based choices. Although our
analysis regarding the effects of small samples does not
confer an evolutionary advantage onto small samples, it
suggests that an organism’s economical search can at least
partly be understood in terms of the statistical structures
of an organism’s niche. We showed that in an environment
of gambles, drawing small samples from payoff distribu-
tions leads to experienced differences of sample means
that are larger than the objective difference (Hertwig &
Pleskac, 2008; Fig. 1). Moreover, for humans such biased
differences make the choice between payoff distributions
simpler. Our analysis also showed that although small
samples increase the chance of choosing the lower-valued
gamble, choices in our environment would not be all that
bad. With as few as seven observations drawn from each
gamble people would choose the higher expected value
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gamble about 81% of the time. Moreover, accurate knowl-
edge derived from larger samples yields surprisingly mod-
est gains in terms of the probability of selecting the higher-
value distribution (diminishing return of the value of infor-
mation; Fig. 2). Together, the increase in difficulty with lar-
ger samples as well as other costs and the increase in
accuracy at a diminishing rate help explain the frugal sam-
pling behavior of people. More generally, we believe that
our analysis calls for investigations of risky decision mak-
ing to consider not only the cognitive processes underlying
choice, but also how those processes interact with the eco-
logical and statistical structures of risky environments (see
also Hau et al., 2010).
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Appendix A. 6
If one assume two options, A and B, of which A’s ex-
pected value is greater than B’s, then the absolute expected
difference between the sample means (or strength of evi-
dence), SMA and SMB, will always be as large or larger than
the expected or description difference, EVA  EVB. To arrive
at this finding, we take the following steps (see Hertwig &
Pleskac, 2008): Setting Y = SMA  SMB, the expected value
of Y, E(Y), can be calculated as follows:
EðYÞ ¼ PðY P 0ÞEðY jY P 0Þ þ PðY < 0ÞEðY jY < 0Þ
¼ EVA  EVB: ð1Þ
The expected absolute difference of E(|Y|) can be found
because using the absolute values is tantamount to moving
the area below ‘‘0”, representing all ‘‘erroneous” differ-
ences (i.e., suggesting B’s expected value to exceed A’s) in
the distribution of differences onto the positive reals. Con-
sequently, the expected absolute difference E(|Y|) can be
stated:
EðjYjÞ ¼ PðY P 0ÞEðYjY P 0Þ  PðY < 0ÞEðYjY < 0Þ: ð2Þ
Because E(Y|Y < 0) is by definition negative (the ex-
pected value of Y given that Y is smaller than 0), the second
term in Eq. (2) becomes positive. Therefore, E(|Y|) is at least
as large as E(Y). Put differently, the experienced difference
is, on average, larger than the objective or description dif-
ference. Several factors can moderate the amplification ef-
fect. Specifically, anything reducing P(Y < 0) will result in
E(|Y|) approaching E(Y). Three factors that do this are (a)
increasing sample size n; (b) increasing the difference be-
tween the expected values of the two options; and (c)
reducing the pooled variance across the two options.
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